Vídeo: "Histoire de la diplomatie française" (em francês)

Documentário simplesmente fantástico sobre a história da diplomacia francesa, produzido pela TV5 Monde.

Rico em depoimentos, documentação e imagens de época.

É uma boa pedida para relaxar nesse fim de ano.

Aproveitem porque ele está disponível para visualização gratuita somente até amanhã (31 de dezembro).

Para ver o documentário, clique aqui:

TV5MONDE : Vidéo : Histoire de la diplomatie française

Foto: Quai d'Orsay (sede da diplomacia francesa).

Analysis: The new Russian military doctrine: more of the same?

The long-awaited publication of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation [1], signed by President Dmitry Medvedev on 5 February 2010, was the result of years of debate within the Russian military and political establishment. The new Russian strategic perspective was expected with anxiety due to the great changes in the international arena since the last edition of the Military Doctrine of the country, in 2000, including: the resurgence of Russian power; the September 11 attacks and the international terrorism; the wars in Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003); NATO’s expansion toward Russia’s borders (2004); and the August War against Georgia (2008).

The military doctrine of a country is always a very important document, as it outlines and provides a measure of predictability to its security policy. In the case of Russia, where the security issues have historically had great influence in government decisions and in the very formation of Russia’s national identity, the study of the new Military Doctrine allows experts to become familiar with a very relevant aspect of the international insertion of Moscow. Based on the text of the Doctrine, this paper aims to highlight its most representative elements and analyze its possible impacts on Russian foreign policy and Moscow’s relations with its neighbors and major powers.

The Military Doctrine of 2010 [2] starts with general provisions which deal with the purposes of the Doctrine relating to the protection of Russia’s national interests of Russia and with the conceptualization of terms such as risk of war (voennaya opasnost’), military threat (voennaya ugroza), local war (lokal’naya voyna) and large-scale war (krupnomasshtabnaya voyna). The doctrine is divided into three sections: the dangers of war and military threats to the Russian Federation (Articles 7 to 16); military policy of the Russian Federation (Articles 17 to 37), and military and economic security of defense (Articles 38 to 53).

Elements

In the beginning of the section on the dangers of war and military threats to Russia, the Doctrine recognizes that the “[e]xisting architecture of international security, including its international legal mechanisms, does not provide equal security for all states” (Russian Federation 2010). This reveals the perception that, despite being well placed within the international security system, Russia estimates that such system provides even greater protection to other states.

The Doctrine recognizes the waning possibility of a large-scale war being waged against Russia, but notices the persistence of some sources of military threat to the country. The expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) towards Russian borders and the intention to give it global functions appears as the first item of the main external dangers of war to the country mentioned in the document. Another danger cited is the establishment of missile defense systems that “[...] undermine global stability and violate the balance of power [...]” (Russian Federation 2010), in a clear reference to the U.S. project of installing a missile defense system in Eastern Europe. Territorial claims against Russia are also evaluated as an external danger of war – here we can remember the Japanese claim on the Kuril Islands. International terrorism is another item quoted in the external dangers of war by the Doctrine.

The Doctrine demonstrates that Moscow will thoroughly monitor the military-strategic scenario in its Near Abroad. Several passages show that will be considered military dangers and threats to Russia the occurrence of the following situations in the territory of its neighbors: the deployment of military contingents belonging to states and organizations which are alien to the region; the use of military force in violation of international law; the escalation in armed conflicts; the activities of international armed radical groups; and the development of military exercises with provocative purposes.

The document recognizes the growing importance of high-precision weapons, information and control systems and robotics for the conduct of contemporary warfare, including through devices remotely controlled by humans. In this subject, it is worth remembering the Russian acquisition of Israeli-made unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV’s) in 2009, which demonstrates both the willingness of Moscow to modernize its armed forces and the inability of the Russian military-industrial complex to produce certain types of weapons required in the 21^st century warfare.

In order to prevent conflicts, the Doctrine attaches great importance to the cooperation and coordination in security issues within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). NATO was not cited in this part, receiving only a brief mention among the organizations with which Russia will seek to develop relationships.

Concerning the use of nuclear weapons, the Doctrine reserves the right of Russia to use them as a response to an attack with weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, chemical or bacteriological) against the country, as well as in the case of aggression with conventional weapons that threatens the very existence of the Russian state. Here, Moscow has adopted the first-use policy of nuclear weapons and adhered to the doctrine of preemptive nuclear strikes – even though the country has already begun pondering about it in the late 1990’s, after NATO’s intervention in Yugoslavia, when the military might of the Atlantic Alliance was greater than Russia’s (Kramnik 2009). According to Russian military commanders, the country will continue to develop and modernize its “nuclear triad”, consisting of land-based ballistic missile systems, nuclear submarines equipped with ballistic missiles and strategic bombers armed with nuclear warheads (RIA Novosti 2010).

However, further details on the Russian nuclear deterrence policy will only be known with the presentation of the Principles of State Nuclear Deterrence Policy to 2020, which were approved together with the Military Doctrine, but have not been released to the public yet.

The Doctrine envisages the use of Russian Armed Forces abroad to protect the interests of Russia and its citizens, among other things, in accordance with international law and Russian federal legislation. In addition, the document ascribes the protection of citizens of the Russian Federation living abroad against armed attacks directed at them as one of the tasks of the Armed Forces in peacetime. As Western analysts suspect, these provisions may give room for a stronger interventionism of the Kremlin in the domestic affairs of states in its Near Abroad – such as Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine – on the pretext of protecting Russian minorities living in these countries. Indeed, the protection of Russian populations was one of the reasons for Moscow’s military intervention in the August War against Georgia in 2008.

The text also delegates to the Armed Forces the task of combating piracy and ensuring the safety of navigation. In fact, this provision is not more than an acknowledgement of the participation of the Russian Navy in suppressing the activities of Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, by sending a task force of three warships from its Pacific fleet to the region in 2009 (RIA Novosti 2009).

Regarding the organization of the military, the Doctrine aims to transform the Armed Forces in a more efficient and mobile force by optimizing the structures of the three armed branches (Air Force, Army and Navy) and independent troops (airborne troops, space and strategic missile forces), with the use of combined arms units performing similar tasks (RIA Novosti 2010).

In the third section of the document, military and economic security of the defense, great attention is paid to economic and social sustainability of the apparatus of national defense and the role of the military-industrial complex in this matter. After all, putting the recent history of Russia in perspective, one can point to the hypertrophy of the military apparatus as one of the decisive causes for the demise of the Soviet experience.

One of the tasks assigned to the military-industrial complex is “[...] to ensure a strategic presence of Russia on the world market of high-technology products and services” (Russian Federation 2010). In fact, the country has managed to maintain a privileged position in the global arms market, accounting for about 25% of all exports in the sector between 2004 and 2008 – in 2007, Russia exported as much as US$ 7.4 billion in defense equipment (SIPRI 2009).

One of the goals of the military-industrial complex is to improve the system of intergovernmental cooperation in the military field. In this subject, it is worth citing the already extensive military cooperation between Russia and India – whose most prominent project is the development of fifth-generation fighter for the Air Forces of the two countries (Sukhoi/HAL FGFA).

Another objective assigned to the military-industrial complex is to ensure Russia’s technological independence in the development of weapons of strategic importance. However, the recent purchases of the French-made Mistral helicopter carrier and of the aforementioned Israeli-made UAV’s show that Russia will have to overcome obstacles of financial and technical nature in order to fully achieve this objective.

The preservation of state control over the organizations of strategic importance within the military-industrial complex is also a goal mentioned in the Doctrine. In fact, this proposal aims to consolidate the measures taken by former President Vladimir Putin related to the defense industry, with the monopoly on exports of Russian arms granted to the state enterprise Rosoboroneksport and the merger of all Russian aerospace industries under a single cluster (United Aircraft Corporation).

The Doctrine cites the progress on negotiations for the establishment of regional security systems as one of the tasks of Russia in the field of political-military cooperation. Here, we can see Moscow’s interest in deepening regional collective security arrangements under the CSTO and the SCO frameworks, as well as an desire to establish the pan-European Treaty of European Security, which has faced a cool reception in Western Europe.

Doctrine’s articles 50 and 51 regarding the tasks and the main priorities of the political-military cooperation clearly show the Russian perception of “concentric circles” of alliances around them (Belarus, CSTO, CIS and CST):

(i) the closest one, with Belarus, involves the coordination in the development of the national armed forces and the use of military infrastructure;

(ii) within the CSTO, aims to the creation of a collective force to ensure common defense;

(iii) within the CIS, seeks to guarantee regional security and to conduct peace operations, and

(iv) within the SCO, recommends the coordination of efforts against possible security threats to the common area and the creation of a legal basis for the organization.

The final clause of the Doctrine states that its content can be corrected due to changes in the character of military threats to Russia and to the conditions of the country’s development. This prediction of adaptability to the Doctrine demonstrates that the Russian authorities responsible for the document are sensitive to the dynamic changes in the nature of contemporary military conflicts, in which the classic conventional war between states coexists with the fourth generation of wars involving non-state actors.

The innovations of the Military Doctrine of 2010 compared to its predecessor were the explicit identification of threats – particularly the placement of NATO as the first in the list of major external dangers of war – and allies, the provision ascribing the right to use troops abroad to protect Russian citizens and the inclusion of the fight against piracy on the list of tasks of the Russian Armed Forces (Saradzhyan 2010).

Conclusion

A document as fundamental as this has two facets: orientation of the Armed Forces in the domestic stage and foreign consumption. It is important to remember that the text of the Doctrine is full of messages carefully targeted to specific audiences (states, organizations etc.). First, the very date of its publication (February 5) is quite symbolic, as it coincided with the beginning of the 46th Munich Security Conference, dedicated to the future of international and European security (Russia Today 2010). Throughout the text, there are frequent references to cooperation with the CSTO, the SCO and the CIS – organizations where Moscow’s influence is considerable – while passages on the rapprochement with NATO are much more scarce. This inspired the reaction of Christopher Bryant (Bryant 2010), the British minister for European Affairs, who said that:

NATO has no intent against Russia. I don’t think any Russian soldier has been involved or will be involved in any action against NATO, whereas, you know, Russians have died from international terrorism. There have been many incidents in the last few years. So, I would challenge Russia and say: no, you are wrong on this.

For Marcel de Haas (de Haas 2010), the explicit reference to NATO’s expansion as a threat and the implicit reference to the missile shield the United States plans to install in Eastern Europe are all running against the core of Obama’s “reset policy” (perezagruska) toward Russia. For de Haas and Richard Weitz (Weitz 2010), the references to NATO show that the new Doctrine reaffirms old Cold War values. This arguments, however, lacks substance since Russia only makes such references to the Atlantic Alliance because it is reacting to a concrete geopolitical situation in which NATO – certainly a product of the Cold War – is approaching its military infrastructure toward Russia’s borders, causing concern in the Kremlin. If NATO’s rhetoric is of partnership and mutual trust with Russia, how to justify its expansion to the East, causing annoyance to its Russian counterparts?

According to the military commentator Ilya Kramnik (Kramnik 2009), the new Doctrine reflects the gradual movement of Russia toward Western standards of military force employment and the abandonment of the ideological aspects that made up the military doctrine of the Soviet Union.

The more assertive content of the Doctrine must be understood as a product of the process of Russia’s resurgence as a power with global reach, characterized by a foreign policy more affirmative of Russian national interests, the recovery of its economy and higher spending on the defense sector – there are plans to increase the current budget of US$ 40 billion by 50% over the next three years (RIA Novosti 2010). The increase in military spending is much more an intention to resume investments in the Russian military infrastructure, which was abandoned in the 1990s, than a movement of militarization for the adoption of interventionist and expansionist policies in the international stage, as argued by some analysts.

Moreover, the content of the Doctrine can also be seen as a post facto legitimization of Russia’s role in the August War against Georgia in 2008 and of other initiatives adopted by Moscow in the field of international security in the period between 2000 and 2010.

Bruno Quadros e Quadros is a student of International Relations at Centro Universitário Curitiba (UniCuritiba), Brazil

—

NOTES

[1] Hereinafter referred to as “Military Doctrine” or “Doctrine”.

[2] The analysis was based on the original document in Russian and English translations were made freely by the author. Since references to the content of the Military Doctrine are very frequent in this paper, we will only write references in parentheses (in the Chicago format) in cases of direct quote from the original text of the Doctrine.

REFERENCES

Bryant, Christopher. “Our intent towards Russia is entirely peaceful”. Interfax. 17 Feb 2010. http://www.interfax-news.com/interview.asp?id=147631 (accessed Feb 20, 2010).

de Haas, Marcel. “Cold War Military Doctrine.” The Moscow Times. 11 Feb 2010. http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/cold-war-military-doctrine/399496.html (accessed Feb 21, 2010).

Russian Federation. “Voennaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [“Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation”], 2010. Moscow, 2010.

Kramnik, Ilya. “Who should fear Russia’s new military doctrine?”. RIA Novosti. 23 Oct 2009. http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20091023/156567212.html (accessed Feb 20, 2010).

RIA Novosti. “Russian warships sail to Horn of Africa on anti-piracy mission”. RIA Novosti. 29 Mar 2009. http://en.rian.ru/russia/20090329/120789018.html (accessed Feb 21, 2010).

RIA Novosti. “Russian president approves new military doctrine”. RIA Novosti. 05 Feb 2010. http://en.rian.ru/mlitary_news/20100205/157785368.html (accessed Feb 20, 2010).

Russia Today. “Russia’s new military doctrine approved”. Russia Today. 05 Feb 2010. http://rt.com/Politics/2010-02-05/russia-military-doctrine-approved.html (accessed Feb 21, 2010).

Saradzhyan, Simon. “Nuclear ‘Constraint’ in Russia”. International Relations and Security Network (ISN). 16 Feb 2010. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Current-Affairs/Security-Watch/Detail/?lng=en&id=112745 (accessed Feb 20, 2010).

SIPRI. 2009. SIPRI Yearbook 2009: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security. Stockholm: SIPRI. http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2009/files/SIPRIYB09summary.pdf.

Weitz, Richard. “Global Insights: Russia’s New Military Doctrine reaffirms Old Values”. World Politics Review. 09 Feb 2010. http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/article.aspx?id=5094 (accessed Feb 21, 2010).

Source: e-International Relations.

Análise: A nova doutrina militar da Rússia

A recente Cúpula da OTAN, realizada em Lisboa, discutiu temas importantes para o futuro da Aliança Atlântica, como a criação de um sistema de defesa antimísseis e o cronograma das operações no Afeganistão. O sucesso da OTAN no gerenciamento desses pontos depende de sua relação com a Rússia, o que ficou evidente pela participação do presidente russo Dmitri Medvedev nos debates. Aqui cabe a pergunta: como Moscou se percebe no atual cenário estratégico-militar internacional?

A publicação da Doutrina Militar da Federação Russa, em fevereiro de 2010, foi o resultado de anos de debates no establishment russo. Esperava-se com ansiedade a nova percepção estratégica russa diante das mudanças no cenário internacional desde sua última Doutrina Militar (2000): a ressurgência do poder russo, a “guerra ao terror”, a expansão da OTAN para o Leste (2004) e a Guerra de Agosto (2008).

A doutrina militar de um país é um documento que confere previsibilidade à sua política de segurança. No caso da Rússia, em que a segurança tem grande peso nas decisões governamentais, o estudo da nova doutrina permite a familiarização com um aspecto muito relevante da inserção internacional de Moscou. Analisamos aqui os possíveis desdobramentos da doutrina para a política externa russa.

No início da seção sobre os perigos de guerra à Rússia, a doutrina reconhece que a "arquitetura de segurança internacional existente (...) não oferece igual segurança a todos os Estados". Isso revela a percepção de que, apesar de estar bem posicionada dentro do regime de segurança internacional, a Rússia avalia que ele fornece proteção ainda maior a outros Estados.

A doutrina reconhece a diminuição da possibilidade de uma guerra de larga escala contra a Rússia, mas percebe a persistência de algumas fontes de ameaça militar ao país. A expansão da OTAN rumo às fronteiras russas é o primeiro item dos principais perigos externos de guerra ao país. Outro perigo é o estabelecimento de sistemas de defesa antimísseis que "abalam a estabilidade global e violam o equilíbrio de forças", em clara referência ao projeto dos EUA de instalação de um sistema de defesa antimísseis no Leste Europeu. Reivindicações territoriais contra a Rússia também são avaliadas como um perigo externo de guerra (o pleito japonês sobre as ilhas Curilas é um exemplo disso), assim como o terrorismo internacional.

Armas nucleares

O documento também revela que Moscou observará atentamente o cenário estratégico-militar em seu “exterior próximo”. Serão considerados perigos e ameaças militares à Rússia a instalação de contingentes militares de Estados e de organismos extrarregionais e a realização de exercícios militares com objetivos provocativos no território de seus vizinhos.

O texto atribui grande importância à articulação em matéria de segurança no âmbito da Organização do Tratado de Segurança Coletiva (CSTO, na sigla em inglês), da Comunidade de Estados Independentes (CEI), da Organização para a Segurança e Cooperação na Europa (OSCE) e da Organização de Cooperação de Xangai (OCS), excluindo-se aqui a OTAN, que mereceu apenas uma breve menção entre as organizações com as quais a Rússia tentará desenvolver relações.

A nova doutrina militar reserva ainda o direito da Rússia de usar armas nucleares como resposta a um ataque com armas de destruição em massa contra o país, assim como no caso de agressão com armas convencionais que ameace a existência do Estado russo. Moscou adota a "política do primeiro uso" (first-use policy) de armas nucleares e adere à doutrina do ataque nuclear preventivo (nuclear preemptive strike).

Independência armamentícia

A proteção de cidadãos russos residentes no exterior contra ataques armados é uma das tarefas das forças armadas em tempos de paz. Isso poderá ensejar um maior intervencionismo do Kremlin em seu “exterior próximo”, sob o pretexto de proteger as minorias russas residentes nesses países. Com efeito, a proteção da população russa foi uma das justificativas de Moscou para atuar na guerra de agosto de 2008 contra a Geórgia.

Uma das tarefas atribuídas ao complexo militar-industrial é "garantir uma presença estratégica da Rússia no mercado mundial de produtos e serviços de alta tecnologia". De fato, o país tem logrado manter uma posição de destaque no mercado mundial de armamentos, respondendo por 25% de todas as exportações do setor entre 2004 e 2008.

Outro objetivo atribuído ao complexo militar-industrial é assegurar a independência tecnológica do país na produção de armas de importância estratégica. No entanto, a recente compra de porta-helicópteros franceses e de VANTs israelenses demonstra que a Rússia terá de contornar obstáculos de natureza financeira e técnica para alcançar esse objetivo.

A doutrina prescreve o avanço nos processos de negociação para o estabelecimento de sistemas regionais de segurança como uma das tarefas da Rússia no campo da cooperação político-militar. Reforça-se a proposta russa para um Tratado de Segurança Europeia em âmbito paneuropeu – o que tem encontrado fria recepção no Ocidente.

Retórica

Um documento tão fundamental como esse possui duas facetas: a orientação das Forças Armadas e o consumo externo. O texto da doutrina está repleto de mensagens cuidadosamente dirigidas a públicos específicos. A data de sua publicação (5 de fevereiro) é bastante simbólica, coincidindo com o início da 46ª Conferência de Segurança de Munique. O texto alude frequentemente à cooperação com organizações em que Moscou é influente (CSTO, OCS e CEI), enquanto as citações à OTAN são muito mais tímidas.

Para Marcel de Haas e Richard Weitz, as referências à OTAN demonstram que a nova doutrina reafirma os valores da Guerra Fria. Essa afirmação carece de fundamento, já que a Rússia apenas faz tais referências à Aliança Atlântica como reação a uma situação geopolítica concreta em que a OTAN – esta, sim, produto da Guerra Fria – está aproximando sua infraestrutura militar das fronteiras russas, causando apreensão no Kremlin. Se a retórica da OTAN é de parceria com a Rússia, como se justifica a sua expansão para o Leste?

O conteúdo mais assertivo da doutrina é reflexo da ressurgência global da Rússia. O aumento das despesas militares representa a intenção de retomar os investimentos na infraestrutura militar russa – que sofreu um sucateamento nos anos 1990 –, e não um movimento de militarização para a adoção de posturas intervencionistas no cenário internacional, como defendem alguns analistas.

*Bruno Quadros e Quadros é analista internacional, bacharel em relações internacionais pelo Centro Universitário Curitiba (Unicuritiba) e editor do blog Urbi et Orbi. Artigo escrito originalmente para o Opera Mundi.

Fonte: Opera Mundi.

Documentary: "Le monde selon Brasilia"

Urbi et Orbi presents a great documentary about Brazilian foreign policy for French speakers.

It is interesting to notice how foreigners view Brazil's international action, without inferiority complex (complexo de vira-lata) and without the prejudices that many Brazilians still have regarding their country's role in the world stage.

The documentary was produced by Franco-German network ARTE TV.

Vídeo: "Le monde selon Brasília"

Para os falantes de francês, eis um grande documentário sobre a diplomacia brasileira.

É interessante perceber como os estrangeiros veem a atuação internacional do Brasil, sem "complexos de vira-lata" e sem os preconceitos que muitos brasileiros ainda têm a respeito do papel do país no cenário mundial.

O documentário foi produzido pelo canal franco-alemão ARTE TV.

Humor Internacionalista: Isla Presidencial (em espanhol)

Trailer:

Personagens:

Primeiro episódio:

Segundo episódio:

Terceiro episódio:

Quarto episódio:

Must-click: University of Michigan's database

Interesting database of the University of Michigan (UMich) on various issues concerning International Relations (from think tanks to decolonization). Click here to access it.

Sugestão: Base de dados da Universidade de Michigan

Interessante base de dados da Universidade de Michigan sobre diferentes temas ligados às Relações Internacionais (desde think tanks até descolonização). Para acessar, clique aqui.

Analysis: The August war, two years later

August 8th, 2010 marks the second anniversary of the conflict that involved Georgia and Russia. While world attention was directed to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the two neighbors of the Caucasus resorted to force to resolve the controversy concerning the status of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the time, a powerful information warfare waged by both sides prevented an evaluation about who would be the "aggressor" and the "victim". As the dust settled from the war, an independent commission, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, produced a detailed report seeking to recover the data concerning the conflict. The conclusion of the Tagliavini Report attributed to both sides the "blame" for the war: Georgia, for having initiated the attacks against separatist forces and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia; and Russia, for having provoked the Georgians and for answering disproportionately to Tbilisi's actions.

It behooves us to examine the consequences of this important conflict for the International Relations. First, in a time dominated by intrastate conflicts and the so-called "asymmetric warfare", the August War provided an example of a classical conventional conflict between two sovereign states.

The conflict was also a display of strength by Moscow, consequence of its resurgence as a world power from the 2000s on. If in the mid-1990s, the administration of Boris Yeltsin was unable to defeat the Chechen separatists in Russia's own territory, in 2008 the country has shown its ability to deploy forces to a theater of war beyond its territory.

The Russian victory assured the de facto independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The juridical status of these two regions has been one of the most delicate issues of the post-war period. Russia finds itself immersed in its "Kosovo syndrome", claiming that the treatment the international community gave to Kosovo should be extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The recent ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stating the compatibility of Kosovo's independence with international law should make the issue even more incendiary for the stability of Caucasus and Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union.

Apparently, the outcome of the war thwarted Putin's plans - but perhaps not those of Medvedev - to topple Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. This seemed to be one of the goals of Moscow's comprehensive response against Georgian territory - and not only against the two regions under dispute.

Tbilisi's defeat hindered Saakashvili's Western-leaning foreign policy objectives: Georgia's accession to NATO and possibly to the European Union. At the same time, it silenced the most serious challenge to Russian hegemony over its "near abroad". Furthermore, it sent a very clear message to extra-regional powers - namely, the United States - that they can not meddle into the affairs of countries within Kremlin's historical region of influence.

Finally, the disproportionate response of Russia must be understood within the context of the oil geopolitics of the region. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was designed to ensure the United States and Western Europe access to Azerbaijan's rich oil reserves bypassing Russia. Thus, the Russian operations in Georgian territory during the August War showed Moscow's intention to influence on the BTC, one of the major oil pipelines bypassing Russian territory.

The August War and the post-war period must be accurately contextualized in the constellation of interests of its actors. The power politics that led Russia and Georgia to war must be understood as the result of those interests, be they political, military, economic or prestige-seeking in the international system.