August 8th, 2010 marks the second anniversary of the conflict that involved Georgia and Russia. While world attention was directed to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the two neighbors of the Caucasus resorted to force to resolve the controversy concerning the status of the breakaway regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. At the time, a powerful information warfare waged by both sides prevented an evaluation about who would be the "aggressor" and the "victim". As the dust settled from the war, an independent commission, headed by Swiss diplomat Heidi Tagliavini, produced a detailed report seeking to recover the data concerning the conflict. The conclusion of the Tagliavini Report attributed to both sides the "blame" for the war: Georgia, for having initiated the attacks against separatist forces and Russian peacekeepers in South Ossetia; and Russia, for having provoked the Georgians and for answering disproportionately to Tbilisi's actions.
It behooves us to examine the consequences of this important conflict for the International Relations. First, in a time dominated by intrastate conflicts and the so-called "asymmetric warfare", the August War provided an example of a classical conventional conflict between two sovereign states.
The conflict was also a display of strength by Moscow, consequence of its resurgence as a world power from the 2000s on. If in the mid-1990s, the administration of Boris Yeltsin was unable to defeat the Chechen separatists in Russia's own territory, in 2008 the country has shown its ability to deploy forces to a theater of war beyond its territory.
The Russian victory assured the de facto independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The juridical status of these two regions has been one of the most delicate issues of the post-war period. Russia finds itself immersed in its "Kosovo syndrome", claiming that the treatment the international community gave to Kosovo should be extended to South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The recent ruling of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stating the compatibility of Kosovo's independence with international law should make the issue even more incendiary for the stability of Caucasus and Russia's relations with the United States and the European Union.
Apparently, the outcome of the war thwarted Putin's plans - but perhaps not those of Medvedev - to topple Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili. This seemed to be one of the goals of Moscow's comprehensive response against Georgian territory - and not only against the two regions under dispute.
Tbilisi's defeat hindered Saakashvili's Western-leaning foreign policy objectives: Georgia's accession to NATO and possibly to the European Union. At the same time, it silenced the most serious challenge to Russian hegemony over its "near abroad". Furthermore, it sent a very clear message to extra-regional powers - namely, the United States - that they can not meddle into the affairs of countries within Kremlin's historical region of influence.
Finally, the disproportionate response of Russia must be understood within the context of the oil geopolitics of the region. The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline was designed to ensure the United States and Western Europe access to Azerbaijan's rich oil reserves bypassing Russia. Thus, the Russian operations in Georgian territory during the August War showed Moscow's intention to influence on the BTC, one of the major oil pipelines bypassing Russian territory.
The August War and the post-war period must be accurately contextualized in the constellation of interests of its actors. The power politics that led Russia and Georgia to war must be understood as the result of those interests, be they political, military, economic or prestige-seeking in the international system.
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